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FRONT PAY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES:
WHAT IT IS, WHY IT IS IMPORTANT AND HOW TO
MAKE IT BETTER
The purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 are
to deter employers from discriminating on the basis of sex or
race and to make the victims of that discrimination whole again
through both equitable and legal remedies.2 Sexual harassment
and discrimination have created roadblocks for working women,
affecting their employment opportunities, advancement and job
performance. 3 In an effort to address this serious problem of
discrimination in the workplace, Congress included Title VII in
the Civil Rights Act.4 Congress amended the statute in 1991,
adding section 1981a, which specifically deals with the types and
amounts of damages possible in Title VII actions.5 Section 1981a
provides caps on compensatory and punitive damages based on
the number of employees in a company.6
Although at first glance this provision seems both precise
and helpful in computing damages, some confusion has surfaced
over whether front pay should be included in the damage caps
provided for in section 1981a.7 This confusion stems from the
inclusion of the phrase "future pecuniary losses" within the
language of the statutory cap on damages.8 By phrasing the
statute in this manner, Congress presented courts with an
ambiguity in classifying front pay as an equitable or legal
remedy.9 Another confusion and controversy in the award of
front pay damages stems from the speculative nature of front
pay, which can result in wildly varying awards. 10
Despite the continuing confusion courts face in awarding
front pay, it has proven a valuable remedy in many cases,
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
3. See LYNNE EISAGUIRRE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 153 (2d
ed. 1997) (listing effects of sexual harassment on job performance, including less job
satisfaction, reduced organizational commitment and less favorable views of company
communications).
4. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
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particularly those involving sexual harassment, in which
reinstatement may not be the best option for the plaintiff.1
To illustrate the importance of front pay in sex
discrimination cases, this Note will first discuss Title VII and
the policies, behind it. Next, it will address sex discrimination
cases, focusing on sexual harassment. Part III of this Note
reviews the types of damages available under Title VII and the
changes made by the 1991 Amendments. Part IV of this Note
will focus on front pay as a remedy in Title VII cases. This
section will begin by providing a general definition of front pay
and will then discuss its application and the benefits and
problems of awarding front pay in sexual harassment claims.
Finally, this Note will explain the ways in which front pay can
be made less speculative and easier to apply, alleviating courts'
hostility to awarding it.
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The Pertinent Text and Amendments of the Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 196412 was passed during a time of
turmoil and change in the United States when citizens, the
media and legislatures questioned the social structure of our
societyand examined the problems inherent in a segregated and
discriminatory society.' 3 The Act is a broad and sweeping piece
of legislation that addresses all types of discrimination,
including voting rights,14  equal access to public
accommodations, 15  and discrimination in employment
opportunities. 16 Title VII,17 which addresses discrimination in
the workplace, is an integral part of the Civil Rights Act, and
provides remedies for those affected by these discriminatory
practices.18
11. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
13. Robert Charles Johnson, Comment, Partnership and Title VI Remedies: Price
Waterhouse Cracks the Glass Ceiling, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 787, 788 (explaining that the
Civil Rights Act was implemented in response to societal problems attributed to
discrimination).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).
15. Id. § 2000a.
16. Johnson, supra note 13, at 789 n.7.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1994).
18. Johnson, supra note 13, at 789 n.7.
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Title VII made employment discrimination based on race,
color, sex, religion or national origin illegal. 19 Originally,
equitable relief, including back pay and reinstatement, was the
remedy available to victims who proved their cases.20 In 1972,
Congress amended the Civil Rights Act to expand the equitable
relief available to successful plaintiffs, giving courts more
discretion to choose among the available remedies. 21 The 1991
amendments to the Act increased the available remedies under
Title VII to include both compensatory and punitive damages.22
The amount of danages that can be recovered is limited or
capped, however, based on the number of employees within the
company.23 These caps set forth in the 1991 Amendments do not
apply to any equitable relief awarded in a discrimination case.24
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1) (1994).
20. Id § 2000e-5(g)(1). Title VII states in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate . . .with or without back pay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 789 (describing the relief initially available under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (adding the phrase "or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate"); see also 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972) (discussing
the legislative purpose of the expansion).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994). In pertinent part:
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or
political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized
under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)].
Id. Before this amendment was passed, only equitable remedies could be awarded to
victims of discrimination. See Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 823 F. Supp. 1475,
1481-82 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (holding that cases involving an alleged act of discrimination
occurring before the effective date of the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of
1964, although filed after the effective date, were not eligible for punitive or
compensatory damages).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994), setting forth the following limitations:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
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The Legislative Purpose and Intent of the Act
The Civil Rights Act is both a remedial and prophylactic
piece of legislation.25 The equitable damages available under the
Civil Rights Act, along with the 1991 inclusion of legal damages,
reflect Congress' commitment to change. 26 In cases brought
under Title VII, an attempt is made to compensate the victims of
discrimination by restoring them to the position they would have
been in absent discriminatory practices by their employers. 27
Courts have interpreted this legislative intent by fashioning
relief based on both the societal goals of prohibiting and
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, $300,000.
Id. Temporary workers and part-time employees are included in the number of
employees considered in this calculation. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., 519 U.S.
202, 206 (1997).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4) (1994) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
the scope of, or the relief available under, section 1981 of this title.").
25. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (stating that
complete remedies under Title VII provide an important incentive and deterrent for
employers to do away with discriminatory practices); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-30 (1971) (holding that Title VII serves a prophylactic purpose by removing
discriminatory barriers and achieving equal employment opportunities); EEOC v.
Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that
complete remedies serve as a deterrent for future violations).
26. See 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972), stating:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide
discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete
relief possible. In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have
stressed that the scope of relief under ... (section 706(g)]... is intended
to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the
attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the
particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also
requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effect of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a
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eliminating discrimination and the individual or private goal of
making the aggrieved employee whole again through damage
awards. 28 While both types of goals are essential to the Civil
Rights Act and must be considered by courts, under Title VII,
the emphasis must be on making the individual whole.29
Enforcement Mechanisms of Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the five-member Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) to
adjudicate cases arising under Title VII. 30 The power of the
EEOC was limited, however, because if it could not resolve the
dispute, the case did not automatically proceed to the courts for
resolution. 31 Plaintiffs under the original 1964 Act could bring
private suits against employers in a federal district court if the
EEOC's efforts at informal disputes resolution failed; however,
the EEOC would no longer be involved. 32
28. See id. ("The courts have been particularly cognizant of the fact that claims under
Title VII involve the vindication of a major public interest, and that any action under the
Act involves considerations beyond those raised by the individual claimant."); see also
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 768 n.28 & 788 n.5 (1976) (awarding
retroactive seniority to a group of non-employee African-American applicants who sought
work, but were denied positions prior to 1972, stating that, without seniority, the relief
would fall short of the make-whole relief mandate of Title VII; both the majority and the
dissent held that the eradication and prevention of employment discrimination are the
primary goals of Title VII); Moody, 422 U.S. at 421 (holding that the application of back
pay provision is consonant with the dual statutory objectives of achieving equal
employment opportunity and make-whole relief); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (stating that the express purpose of Title VII is to assure equal
opportunities in employment and the elimination of discriminatory practices); Griggs,
401 U.S. at 429-30 (asserting that the objective of Title VII is to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated to favor one group of
employees over another). See generally J. Hoult Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims
of Preferential Employment Discrimination Remedies, 98 YALE L.J. 1479 (1989)
(discussing the tension that sometimes arises between the goals of preventing
discrimination and providing remedy to the victim).
29. See EEOC v. Gen. Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d 1555, 1558 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that
if courts do not make the individual whole through the remedial provisions of the
statute, they must articulate their reasons for not doing so); see also Susan K
Grebeldinger, The Role of Workplace Hostility in Determining Prospective Remedies for
Employment Discrimination: A Call for Greater Judicial Discretion in Awarding Front
Pay, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 319, 326 (discussing the dual purposes of the Civil Rights Act
and the preference for relief that makes plaintiffs whole).
30. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 705(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a)
(1994).
31. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 789 (discussing procedures for processing claims
under the original EEOC). The commission could refer suits to the Attorney General,
who could file actions in district court based on pattern or practice or submit amicus
briefs if the individual brought suit. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-6(a) (1994).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a).
222 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:217
Congress realized that the EEOC lacked enforcement
powers and proposed many amendments to its grant of power to
the Commission;33 however, the amendments to the Act were not
passed until 1972.3 4 . The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 granted the EEOC the power to sue offending employers
directly in district court.35 If the EEOC chooses not to pursue
the matter, either by not bringing suit or by dismissing the
action outright, individuals can still initiate a private suit.36
SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII:
A UNIQUE CLAIM
The Civil Rights Act precludes discrimination based on
sex.37 The more sensitive and confusing issue has been defining
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by
Title VII, a concept the courts did not recognize until 1976.38
In 1980, the EEOC formally affirmed sexual harassment as
a claim under Title VII and established guidelines for analyzing
those claims. 39 The EEOC reaffirmed these interim guidelines
after it had the chance to analyze public comments.40 The EEOC
33. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 789-90 (discussing the lack of enforcement powers
in the original EEOC configuration, proposed alternatives and the current formation).
34. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1994) (granting additional enforcement
capabilities to EEOC).
35. See id. § 2000e-5 (providing the EEOC with the power to sue violators in court).
36. See id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (stating that employers are prohibited from
discriminating based on 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Courts have
struggled with the fact that there is limited legislative history on the issue of
discrimination based on sex. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)
("[Wie are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's
prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875
(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that there is "[vlirtually no legislative history provid[ing] guidance
to courts interpreting the prohibition of sex discrimination"). The 1972 amendments to
Title VII provided some clarification of congressional intent to eliminate sexual
discrimination through Title VII. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 790-91.
38. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 651-61 (D.D.C. 1976), revd sub. nom. on
other grounds Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1978); (becoming the
first case to hold that sexual harassment constituted sexual discrimination and therefore
falls under Title VII); see also Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (holding that there can be a claim
under Title VII for sexual discrimination based on a discriminatory work environment,
even without detrimental effects to a tangible job benefit); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that sexual discrimination occurs when, but for his/
her sex, an employee would not have faced the discriminatory treatment).
39. See Amendment to Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg.
25,024 (Aug. 1, 1980) (codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604) (2000).
40. See Final Amendment to Guidelines of Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604) (2000).
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guidelines set forth the following conduct as violative of Title
VII:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.41
EEOC decisions and guidelines are not binding on courts. 42
Thus, while these guidelines helped to clarify the issue, it was
not until the Supreme Court decided Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson 43 that sexual harassment gained total acceptance in
the lower courts as a form of sex discrimination.44
Courts have recognized two types of sexual harassment as
sexual discrimination: quid pro quo45  and hostile work
environment claims.46 With either type of sexual harassment
41. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2000).
42. See Elizabeth Papacek, Comment, Sexual Harassment and the Struggle for Equal
Treatment Under Title VII: Front Pay as an Appropriate Remedy, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 743, 752 (1998).
43. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
44. See Papacek, supra note 42, at 753-55 (discussing courts' growing acceptance of
sexual harassment claims).
45. By definition, quid pro quo sexual harassment entails the demand of a sexual
favor by a superior coupled with a threat of adverse effects on advancement or
employment. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982). The
Eleventh Circuit set forth the elements of quid pro quo sexual harassment in Henson as
follows:
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) subjection to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon sex; (4) the employee's
reaction to the harassment affected a tangible term, condition or
privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate
remedial action.
Id.
46. The factors to be considered when evaluating a hostile work environment claim
were set forth in Harris u. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510-U.S. 17, 23 (1993), and include: "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance." Id. This is not a test per se, but rather a totality
of the circumstances framework whereby no single factor is controlling. See id.; see also
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57 (recognizing a claim for a hostile work environment); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the determination of whether a
work environment is hostile must be made from the plaintiffs perspective).
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claim, the plaintiff must show elements of both unwelcomeness
and motive.47  These requirements are unique to sex
discrimination cases and do not apply to other Title VII
actions.48
Aside from the unique and stringent legal requirements of
sexual harassment claims, victims of sexual harassment may
also experience serious psychological effects. Sexual harassment
has been shown to harm the victim's entire employment
experience, affecting one's attitude toward the company,
performance and opportunities. 49 Victims of sexual harassment
also suffer detrimental psychological effects. 50  Some noted
effects of sexual harassment include: "anxiety attacks,
headaches, sleep disturbance, disordered eating, gastrointestinal
disorders, nausea, weight loss or gain, and crying spells."51 In
1987, the American Psychiatric Association cited sexual
harassment as a "'severe stressor." 52 Further, a correlation has
been noted between post-traumatic stress disorder and the
effects of sexual harassment.53 Memories of sexual harassment
can be so traumatic to the victim that she may repress them.54
Such serious psychological consequences for victims of
sexual harassment indicate that the remedy of reinstatement is
47. See Papacek, supra note 42, at 756 (explaining the elements of sexual harassment
claims and the differences between these and other Title VII claims).
48. See id.
49. See EISAGUIRRE, supra note 3, at 153 (citing common responses to a survey
concerning the effects of sexual harassment: "1. Less job satisfaction 2. Lower rating of
their immediate supervisor 3. Less favorable view of company communication 4.
Diminished confidence in the senior management team 5. Reduced organizational
commitment and 6. Increased likelihood of leaving the company").
50. See id. at 150-54 (describing the psychological, as well as employment effects, of
sexual harassment on victims).
51. Id. at 152-53; see also JANA HOWARD CAREY, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE: DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A SUCCESSFUL POLICY, CONDUCTING THE
INVESTIGATION, PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES 49 (1992) (citing a 1982 study
which found the following effects of sexual harassment: "self blame, depression, anger,
disgust, sadness, and generalized anxiety"). In fact, some psychologists compare the
effects of sexual harassment to those of rape. To prevail in her claim, of course, the
victim must show only differential treatment on the basis of sex. See id. at 50.
52. EISAGUIRRE, supra note 3, at 152 (citation omitted).
53. See id. at 154 (citing a 1994 study that found women suffering from post-
traumatic stress syndrome and depression "were more likely to have been sexually
harassed than those who had never experienced these problems") (citation omitted). In a
separate survey of public utility employees, "those women who had experienced
harassment were more likely to report symptoms associated with [post traumatic stress
syndrome] than were women who had not been harassed." Id. (citation omitted).
54. See id. at 154 (explaining the repression of traumatic experiences such as sexual
harassment).
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not a viable option for many plaintiffs. 55  Reinstatement is
generally found to be inappropriate when the hostility of the
workplace would make a continued employment relationship
unworkable and unproductive. 56 Although it is not always
conclusive proof that reinstatement is not an option,57 evidence
of the hostility at the workplace provides strong support for the
proposition.58  In cases such as these, front pay becomes
essential in the make-whole policy of Title VII.59
Damages Available Under Title VII
The 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act broadened the
range of remedies available under Title VII when a plaintiff
proves her case of discrimination. Historically, only equitable
remedies were available to plaintiffs.60 Compensatory and
punitive damages were made available, in addition to the
traditional remedies, with the adoption of the 1991
amendments. 61  To better understand the impact these
additional remedies had on Title VII claims, a brief description
of each available type of damages is useful.
Equitable remedies generally attempt to make a plaintiff
whole, thus serving justice by providing a complete remedy. 62
Equitable remedies under Title VII traditionally provided relief
55. See McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1992)
(observing that reinstatement is typically the: preferred, rather than mandatory,
remedy); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980)
(upholding front pay in lieu of reinstatement where defendant had engaged in
"psychological warfare" against plaintiff). See also Grebeldinger, supra note 29, at 319
(discussing the judicial preference, not statutory mandate, for reinstatement instead of
front pay as a remedy for Title VII cases).
56. See Papacek, supra note 42, at 775-76 (explaining the situations in which
reinstatement is not typically awarded).
57. See id. at 776-77 (stating that proof of hostile work environment does not always
result in excluding reinstatement as a remedy).
58. See id. (discussing the proof of hostile environment in sexual harassment claims
and its effect on remedies).
59. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984)
(stressing trial court discretion in the use of front pay to make a plaintiff whole in cases
where the hostile work environment is proven).
60. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994)
(providing for equitable relief).
61. See id. § 1981a (providing the additional remedies of compensatory and punitive
damages).
62. See Eileen Kuklis, Comment, The Future of Front Pay Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Will It Be Subject to the Damage Caps?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 465, 474 (1996)
(discussing the goals of equitable remedies).
20001 225
226 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:217
in the form of back pay and reinstatement. 63 The Supreme
Court set forth the following test in Ross v. Bernhard64 for
determining whether equitable relief is available: (1) how the
cause of action was handled prior to the merger of courts of law
and courts of equity, (2) the nature of the remedy sought, and (3)
whether the issues raised by the cause of action are within the
abilities of the jury to comprehend. 65 In later cases, however,
the Supreme Court has focused on the second prong of this
test-the nature of the remedy sought-and whether a legal
remedy would be adequate to compensate the plaintiff to
determine the type of relief to award.66
With equitable remedies, Congress established another
means of redress in employment discrimination cases.67
Although legal damages are available under Title VII, they do
not adequately compensate society with respect to the public
interest in equality of employment opportunities. 68
Back pay is one of the equitable remedies available under
Title VII.69 Back pay compensates plaintiffs for the wages they
would have received but for the employer's unlawful,
discriminatory actions, less any income earned from the time of
the discharge through the time the court renders its verdict. 70
Reinstatement is another possible remedy under Title VII. 71
It places the employee back into her previous employment
position or a comparable one.72  Currently, courts favor
reinstatement over other forms of relief in discrimination cases
due to its predictable nature and the ease with which the courts
63. See Papacek, supra note 42, at 774 (discussing the early application of remedies
to Title VII).
64. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
65. Id. at 538 n.10.
66. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1974) (holding that the nature of the
remedy sought in a Title VII action was legal in nature); see also Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 43-53 (1971) (noting a "basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of
equity should not act.., when the serving party has an adequate remedy at law").
67. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 797 (discussing the remedies available in
employment discrimination cases).
68. See id. at 800 (discussing the societal harm of discrimination in employment and
the failure of legal damages to redress that harm).
69. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (listing
back pay as a remedy).
70. See Kuklis, supra note 62, at 467 n.13 (explaining the nature and computation of
back pay).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (listing reinstatement as a remedy in Title VII cases).
72. Kuklis, supra note 62, at 467 n.14 (explaining the nature and use of
reinstatement).
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can implement it. 73 As stated previously, Congress included the
phrase "any other equitable relief deemed necessary,"74 thus
granting the courts more discretionary power and creating more
confusion as to what remedies were available. 75 Historically,
front pay has been awarded under this clause. 76
Although equitable forms of relief have always been
available under Title VII, the 1991 amendments to the Act
authorized additional legal damages, specifically compensatory
and limited punitive damages, to prevailing plaintiffs. 77
Compensatory damages are generally defined as "damages in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained."78
The Act lists the following types of injuries to be considered in
the award of compensatory damages in discrimination cases:
"future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other nonpecuniary losses."79  The ultimate purpose of
compensatory damages is "to make the party whole, to the
extent that it is possible to measure his injury in terms of
money."80
In addition to compensatory damages, limited punitive
damages were also made available through the 1991
amendments. 81 To enhance compensatory damages, courts can
award punitive damages when the plaintiff proves that the
defendant's acts were "wanton, reckless, malicious, or oppressive
[in] character."82 The purpose of punitive damages is not to
make the plaintiff whole, but rather to punish the defendant and
deter him/her and others from repeating the illegal behavior. 83
A plaintiff who is awarded compensatory damages does not
73. See McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 873 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("Reinstatement is often appropriate as the means to make plaintiff whole for the
unlawful discrimination that the plaintiff has suffered and to place the plaintiff in the
same position that the plaintiff would have been in absent the discriminatory conduct.").
74. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(c) (1994).
75. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
76. See Anne-Marie Carstens, Note, The Front Pay Niche: Reinstatement's Alter Ego
Is Equitable Relief for Sex Discrimination Victims, 88 GEO. L.J. 299, 315 (2000)
(describing the use of front pay as an historically equitable remedy).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994).
78. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 23 (1988).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3). The inclusion of the phrase "future pecuniary losses" has
caused confusion in some courts as to whether front pay is included in the damage caps.
See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
80. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 26 (1988).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994) (including punitive damages as a remedy for Title
VII plaintiffs).
82. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 731 (1988).
83. See id. § 733.
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necessarily receive both compensatory and punitive damages, as
punitive damages require a higher state of mind, one of "malice
or reckless indifference." 84
Through compensatory and punitive damages, or legal
damages, Congress has established another means of redress in
Title VII employment discrimination cases.85 Although legal
damages are now available under Title VII, they do not
adequately compensate society with respect to the public interest
in equality of employment opportunities.86  Such societal
interests are better represented through equitable remedies,
such as back pay, reinstatement, and front pay.8 7
FRONT PAY
Definition
In Title VII cases, front pay is an award of monetary
damages and is intended to compensate the victim of
discrimination for "future economic losses likely to be suffered
between the date of judgment and the time the victim reaches
his or her rightful place."88 The purpose of front pay is to
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,
538 (1999). In Kolstad the court held that in a Title VII case:
That conduct committed with the specified mental state may be
characterized as egregious, however, is not to say that employers must
engage in conduct with some independent, "egregious" quality before
being subject to a punitive award.
To be sure, egregious or outrageous acts may serve as evidence
supporting an inference of the requisite "evil motive."
Id. Kolstad also states that the malice or reckless indifference required by the 1991
amendments does not necessarily indicate intentional discrimination or particularly
egregious discriminatory acts, but also includes malice or reckless indifference to
plaintiffs federally protected rights. It is based solely on the employer's state of mind,
the intentional or knowing violation of federal law. Id. at 536.
85. See Papacek, supra note 42, at 762-63 (discussing the addition of compensatory
and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases).
86. See id. at 800 (discussing the societal harm of discrimination in employment and
the failure of legal damages to redress that harm).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 768; see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976)
(holding that front pay is designed to put the victim of discrimination in the position that
he/she would have been in but for the unlawful conduct); Downes v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1141 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994) (defining front pay as '"a lump sum ...
representing the discounted present value of the difference between the earnings [an
employee] would have received in his old employment and the earnings he can be
expected to receive in his present and future, and by hypothesis, inferior employment'"
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th
Cir. 1991) (defining front pay as a monetary value of lost employment opportunities).
But see Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d.869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that damages
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supplement back pay and alleviate the "continuing future effects
of discrimination .. "89 In order to further the make-whole
policy, front pay is calculated using an estimated amount of
what the plaintiff would have earned if reinstated and an award
for lost future earnings.90 The particular factors courts use to
determine whether front pay is an appropriate remedy in lieu of
reinstatement include: (1) whether the plaintiff has been made
whole by back pay, (2) whether front pay would be unduly
speculative given the plaintiff's prospects for continued
employment, (3) whether reinstatement is appropriate or
feasible, (4) whether liquidated damages have been awarded;
and (5) whether the former employer's financial condition is
adverse.91
In consideration of such criteria, Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co. 92 explicitly endorsed front pay. The Fourth Circuit
emphasized the make-whole policy of Title VII and
supplemented back pay with a front pay award. 93  The
supplemental damages "estimated [the] present value of lost
earnings that are reasonably likely to occur between the date of
judgment and the time when the employee can assume his new
position."94 Other courts have been hesitant to use front pay as
a remedy, however, preferring to use the more traditional
remedies of back pay and reinstatement.95
An often cited and troubling disadvantage of front pay is its
speculative nature. The award of front pay can last until
are settled on date of judgment and plaintiff cannot recover front pay even though the
injury to economic status continues).
89. William J. Martinez & Kathleen M. Flynn, Damage Caps Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, COLO. LAW. 65, 66 n.29 (Mar. 27, 1998) (citing Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi.,
Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1995)).
90. See JULIE O'DONNEL ALLEN ET. AL, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC,
FEDERAL REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. ACTIONS § 9.32 (2000), EDP IL-
CLE 9-1 (explaining the role of front pay as a make-whole remedy).
91. See 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2974 (1993).
92. 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
93. Id. at 269.
94. Id.
95. See Papacek, supra note 42, at 772-75 (discussing the preference of courts toward
back pay and reinstatement instead of front pay); see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458
U.S. 219 (1982) (stating that if reinstatement provides appropriate relief, front pay
should not be awarded); Contardo v. Merrill Lynch, 753 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D. Mass.
1990) (holding that front pay should not be awarded because calculation of the award
would be "unduly speculative"). But see 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination. § 2973
(1993) (stating that front pay should be awarded when remedies such as reinstatement,
hiring or promotion are not available).
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retirement age or only a few months.96 Judges are wary of these
wildly varying amounts and the uncertainties inherent within
the calculation of front pay. It is within courts' discretion to
decide what factors are used to determine if, how much, and for
how long front pay should be awarded. 97 Further complicating
this matter is the current debate over the nature of front pay as
an equitable or legal remedy., Some argue that front pay is a
legal remedy, included within compensatory damages as defined
by the 1991 Amendments to the Act.98 Thus, judges are
presented with unresolved issues when dealing with front pay:
Is it equitable or legal in nature? Can it only be awarded in lieu
of reinstatement? What factors should or can one use in reaching
a determination on the amount?
The Nature of Front Pay: Equitable or Legal?
Overwhelming authority seems to indicate that front pay
should be considered an equitable remedy. 99 Although front pay
is a monetary award, it should be considered an equitable relief
because it restores a victim of sexual harassment to her rightful
position. Legislative history, though limited, supports this
characterization. 100 The EEOC has also taken the position that
front pay is not a form of compensatory damages, and thus, is
96. See Padilla v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1996)
(awarding over twenty years' worth of front pay); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958
F.2d 1176, 1189-90 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming an award of speculative damages for
seventeen years); see also Wilcox v. Stratton Lumber, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 837, 841, 844
(D. Me. 1996) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages, but denying front pay
because the court found plaintiff's testimony about limited prospects for similar
employment speculative and not supported by any expert testimony); Eldred v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 907 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding the speculative inquiry
precluded award of front pay); Buckley v. Reynolds Metals, Co., 690 F. Supp. 211, 216
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). The court in Buckley held:
Front pay awards have been considered unduly speculative in situations
where the discharged employee is at the lower end of the protected class,
that is, forty years old, and where an award may encompass ten years or
more "during which the employee, had he not been unlawfully
discharged but continued in his employment, 'might or might not get
raises, reductions, fired or incapacitated. '"
Id. (citations omitted).
97. See infra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
99. See Brown v. Youth Serv. Int'l of Bait., Inc., 904 F. Supp. 469, 471 (D. Md. 1995)
(holding that front pay, along with back pay, is separate from compensatory damages);
Bartlett v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1246, 1253-65 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (calculating
front pay separately from compensatory damages).
100. See Kuklis, supra note 62, at 484 (stating that congressional silence is an
indication that front pay should not be included in the damage caps, but rather, the
damage caps were an attempt at tort reform).
FRONT PAY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
not capped under section 1981a. 101  This argument is
particularly convincing when front pay is awarded in lieu of
reinstatement, a traditional equitable remedy.
0 2
Despite apparent support in the legislative history for the
proposition that front pay is equitable and not compensatory in
nature, Congress' inclusion of the words "future pecuniary
losses" within the compensatory damages provision of section
1981a blurred the line between equitable and legal remedies
with regard to front pay. This lack of precision created confusion
among the courts. 10 3 The confusion has resulted, in large part,
because front pay is a future monetary damage, which seems to
indicate it should be included within the compensatory damage
cap as a legal remedy. I °4 However, not all monetary damages
are considered legal damages. 10 5 In Hudson v. Reno,10 6 the
Sixth Circuit examined the definition of "future pecuniary
losses,"10 7 concluding that front pay fit the plain meaning of the
words, and that the purpose of front pay indicated it should be
included under the damage caps in section 1981a.
10 8
Aside from the language "future penuniary losses" found in
the 1991 Amendments, front pay should be found to share other
characteristics of legal remedies prior to subjecting it to damage
caps. Other characteristics of legal remedies include "their
uniformity, their unchangeableness or fixedness, their lack of
adaptation to circumstances, and the technical rules which
govern their use."10 9 As the widely varying awards and the
plethora of formulas used to calculate front pay show, its
101. See EEOC Policy Guidelines, Dec. No. 915.002, 1992 WL 189089 (July 14, 1992)
(stating that front pay is an equitable remedy); see also Carpenter v. Glickman Agency
No. 92-0615, 1995 WL 434072 (July 17, 1995) (holding explicitly that front pay is an
equitable remedy).
102. See Carstens, supra note 76, at 306 (discussing the use of front pay in lieu of
reinstatement).
103. Id. at 301 (stating that there has been confusion in the courts over the legal or
equitable nature of front pay due to the use of the term "future pecuniary losses" in the
compensatory damage amendment to the Civil Rights Act).
104. See Kuklis, supra note 62, at 475 (explaining the reasoning behind classifying
front pay as a legal damage); see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)
(recognizing that monetary relief such as "actual and punitive damages" is traditionally
regarded as a "form of relief offered in the courts of law").
105. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 ("We need not, and do not, go so far as to say that any
award of monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief.").
106. 130 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1997).
107. Id. at 1203. The court used the Webster's Dictionary definition of the words as
follows: "1. Future: existing or occurring at a later time; 2. Pecuniary: consisting of or
measured in money; 3. Losses: an amount that is lost." Id.
108. See id. at 1203-04 (holding that, given the plain meaning of the words of the Act,
front pay is included as a compensatory damage and, therefore, capped).
109. Kuklis, supra note 62, at 475 n.64.
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application is anything but uniform. 110 Front pay is also very
flexible and adaptable to individual circumstances. 111 Even with
the added feature of uniformity, its use as an alternative to
reinstatement and its adaptability to individual circumstances
indicate that it should not be considered a legal remedy but
rather an equitable remedy.
In response to such arguments that front pay should be
classified as a legal remedy, a comparison of front pay to back
pay, the equitable nature of which is virtually unquestioned, 1 12
is helpful. Back pay and front pay are similar in nature and
purpose, both attempting to fulfill Title VII's make-whole
objective. In fact, it has been argued that front pay is "merely a
continuation of back pay ..... 113 Many courts have taken this
view of front pay and reject classifying it as a legal remedy.114
Front pay's adaptability to the individual circumstances in
each case and the discretion in its application, in addition to the
factors discussed above, support the argument that it should be
classified as an equitable remedy. 115 If front pay is classified as
a compensatory damage, it is a form of legal remedy and is thus
subject to the damage caps of section 1981a. 116  Without
uncapped front pay damages, the deterrent and make-whole
policy objectives of Title VII could be in jeopardy, particularly in
hostile work environment cases where reinstatement may not be
a viable remedy.117
Computation and Duration
Front pay is generally calculated as "the difference (after
proper discounting of present value) between what a plaintiff
would have earned in the future had he or she been reinstated at
the time of trial and what the plaintiff would have earned in the
110. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; infra notes 118-29 and accompanying
text.
112. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-22 (1975) (holding that back
pay is an equitable remedy); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (holding that back
pay, although a form of monetary restitution, is equitable under the 1964 Act).
113. Papacek, supra note 42, at 773.
114. See Carstens, supra note 76, at 311 ("[AIll but two of the federal circuits have
stated unequivocally that front pay is an equitable remedy for employment
discrimination.").
115. See id. at 327 (concluding that the history, legislative intent and nature of front
pay indicate that it is an equitable remedy).
116. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text
FRONT PAY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
future in his or her next best employment."118  Factors
considered in computing front pay focus on "the availability of
employment opportunities, the period within which one by
reasonable efforts may be re-employed, [and] the employee's
work and life expectancy."119
In McKnight v. General Motors Corp.,120 the Second Circuit
attempted to provide guidelines for awarding front pay by
holding that the plaintiff must provide the necessary data to
calculate a reasonably certain front pay award. Relevant factors
include the length of time the plaintiff expected to work for the
defendant, the applicable discount rate and the amount of the
award.121 While these specific factors have not been widely
adopted, courts have adopted variations of them when
determining front pay awards. 122
In 1996, the court in Suggs v. Servicemaster Educational
Food Management123 attempted to provide greater guidance in
the computation of front pay:
Generally, in awarding front pay, the following factors are
relevant: (1) the employee's future in the position from which
she was terminated; (2) her work and life expectancy; (3) her
obligation to mitigate her damages; (4) the availability of
comparable employment opportunities and. the time
reasonably required to find substitute employment; (5) the
discount tables to determine the present value of future
118. Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 123.1 (7th Cir. 1995).
119. Koyen v. Consol. Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
120. 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1992).
121. See id.
122. E.g., Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (considering the
following factors in determining the amount to be awarded as front pay: the plaintiff's
age; the plaintiff's intention to continue employment with the employer; the length of
time persons in similar positions have stayed with the employer; how long the
replacement employee stayed in the position; the plaintiff's efforts at mitigating damages
and the employer's proof of how long the plaintiff would have remained employed); Roush
v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 10 F.3d 392, 399 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the award of front
pay should "be guided by consideration of certain factors, including:] an employee's duty
to mitigate; 'the availability of employment opportunities, the period within which one by
reasonable efforts may be re-employed, the employee's work and life expectancy, the [use
ofl discount tables to determine the present value of future damages and other factors
that are pertinent or prospective damage awards.') (citation omitted); Reneau v. Wayne
Griffin & Sons, Inc., 945 F.2d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1991) (considering the following factors
in determining the amount of front pay to be awarded: "length of prior employment, the
permanency of the position held, the nature of work, the age, [and] physical condition of
the employee and possible consolidation of jobs").
123. 72 F.3d 1228 (6th Cir. 1996).
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damages; and (6) "other factors that are pertinent in
prospective damage awards."124
Although this formulation includes the factors considered
relevant in McKnight,125 it also expands the inquiry into the
employee's future with the employer, as well as her future
generally as an employee.
The Suggs formulation for calculating front pay specifically
incorporates one of the inherent controls of front pay, the
employee's duty to mitigate his/her damages. 126 Plaintiffs filing
under Title VII have a duty to mitigate damages by reasonable
diligence. 127 The temporary nature of front pay also controls the
period of pay awarded. 128 Despite the trend towards a greater
use of front pay, the adoption of various criteria by which to
judge it, and the inherent controls in front pay awards, many
courts remain uncertain about the use of front pay because of its
speculative nature. 129
Making Front Pay a Better Remedy
The importance of front pay as a remedy in Title VII caseg,
particularly sexual harassment cases, is readily identifiable.
When reinstatement is not a tenable option, front pay is the only
way to ensure that the deterrent and make-whole policies of
Title VII are fulfilled. 130 Considering the potential, physical,
psychological and emotional effects of sexual harassment on its
victim,131 front pay may be the plaintiffs only option to be
adequately restored to her rightful position.
Courts' general hostility to awarding front pay seems to be
based primarily on its uncertainty and speculative nature.132
Front pay may be considered speculative in nature because the
award must be determined by individual circumstances on a case
by case basis. However, the benefits of front pay, and the
124. Id. at 1234 (citations omitted).
125. 973 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1992).
126. See Suggs, 72 F.3d at 1228.
127. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1427-28 (requiring plaintiff to
use reasonable diligence in searching for alternative employment); Papacek, supra note
42, at 743 (discussing the duty of employees to mitigate damages as an inherent control
on front pay awards).
128. See Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Front pay is intended to be temporary in nature.").
129. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
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seemingly growing number of sexual harassment and hostile
work environment cases, demand a more frequent application.
One way to increase the use of front pay is to alleviate
judges' fear of its speculative nature and widely varying
awards.133 For this reason, adopting a formula that takes into
account the characteristics of individual plaintiffs and
defendants would bring more certainty in front pay awards
without losing the flexibility that makes it such an attractive
remedy. Further, such a formula would not be overly difficult for
judges or juries to apply, and would simplify the process. 134
A formula for front pay should take into account the history
of the defendant, include the average length of employment for
employees not exceeding a certain number of years, and exclude
temporary workers. This information should be provided by the
employer, as it has easier access to the necessary information.
Establishing the average length of employment at a place of
business will allow the fact finder to determine the amount of
time that would reasonably be left in the employee's career with
that particular employer but for the illegal behavior.
The second factor to be considered would be the employee's
history with the employer. Performance evaluations and rates of
promotion should be considered here. A comparison to the
performance reviews of the average employee would assist the
fact finder in evaluating the plaintiff's employment history.
Again, the company should provide this data due to its ready
access to the information.
Finally, the fact finder would need to consider the
employee's job search while the action is pending. Since front
pay is designed to be temporary in nature, 135 the employee has a
duty to mitigate the damages incurred by the employer. 13
6
Testimony by the employee should satisfy this requirement. If
the employee claims that a comparable job cannot be found, she
should provide an expert to attest to the current job market.
While all of these factors have been used by courts before in
some form and combination, 137 this allocation of burdens and a
mandate that all courts follow the steps would make front pay
an easier remedy to apply. Such a formula allows front pay to
133. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
134. See Koyen v. Consol. Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1167-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that prospective losses can easily be decided by juries or the court based upon
the individual facts of the case).
135. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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retain its flexibility, making it adaptable to the particular
circumstances of each case. To be sure, codifying the steps in the
analysis of front pay may cause more speculation as to its
inherently equitable nature, 138 and in turn create more
ambiguity in the calculation of damages, as codification tends to
suggest that front pay is a legal remedy subject to a damage cap.
Nevertheless, its adaptation to individual circumstances and the
judicial discretion involved in the decision to award front pay in
lieu of reinstatement ensures that front pay will retain its
equitable nature. 139 Also, front pay's history in the courts, prior
to the amendments, as an equitable remedy140 and its
similarities to back pay141 make a compelling case for a
continued equitable classification.
CONCLUSION
Given the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, front pay is an
important remedy for victims of discrimination, particularly in
hostile work environment cases. Front pay allows victims of
sexual harassment and sex discrimination to be made whole
without returning to an uncomfortable situation with a former
employer. Requiring employers to provide the bulk of the
information required to determine the amount of a front pay
award in these types of cases takes an unnecessary burden off of
plaintiffs, and fully compensating those who prove their cases
satisfies the objectives of Title VII.
By combining front pay with back pay, and taking
advantage of the legal remedies available under Title VII, this
formula would also satisfy the make-whole objective of Title VII
when reinstatement is not desirable. While most, if not all, of
these factors are considered in the current, although varying,
formulations used to analyze and award claims for front pay,
codifying these three steps and requiring fact finders to carefully
examine all of them would lessen the uncertainty presently
found in front pay awards. This approach would also avoid the
large variations in the amounts awarded, thus making judges
more comfortable with the process.
138. See supra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
139. See id.
140. See Carstens, supra note 76, at 315 (discussing front pay's status as a remedy
before the 1991 amendments: an equitable remedy analogous to back pay, and later by
its own right).
141. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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Given the potentially serious consequences of sexual
harassment, 142 a forward-looking remedy that makes a plaintiff
whole without mandating a return to the hostile work
environment is essential. The Supreme Court should clarify
what factors ought to be considered in evaluating and awarding
claims for front pay. The adoption of a uniform set of factors,
with the burdens for plaintiffs and defendants clearly outlined,
would make such claims easier for courts to manage.
Making front pay more certain, and hence more acceptable
to judges, will allow for more frequent use thereof, as front pay is
an essential part of the damages consideration in Title VII cases,
particularly in hostile environment sexual harassment cases.
Application of front pay in these types of situations fully satisfies
both the deterrent and make-whole objectives of Title VII.
VALERIE HARRIS
142. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
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